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Sunseri (Kevin) v. State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 58 (Sep. 23, 2021)1 
CRIMINAL LAW: VIOLATION OF A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL 
AS GROUNDS TO WITHDRAW A GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT 
Summary 
 A defendant charged with a crime has a right to a speedy trial.2 Violation of this right may 
serve as the grounds for granting a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea agreement, 
particularly where the defendant was not aware that this right was violated at the time he entered 
the plea agreement.  
Background 
 The Appellee, the State, held a warrant for the arrest of the Appellant, Kevin Sunseri, for 
a robbery the Appellant committed. At the time that the warrant was issued, however, Appellant 
had been serving a two-to-five-year sentence for an unrelated crime since May 25, 2016. The arrest 
warrant pertaining to the robbery was not executed immediately.  
 Appellant served his sentence, and his release date was scheduled for August 27, 2018. 
Instead of releasing the Appellant, the State transferred Appellant to the jail to execute the arrest 
warrant. Appellant was not aware of the arrest warrant until his transfer. Appellant agreed to plead 
guilty to robbery and ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Appellant 
subsequently suffered significant mental health issues and was deemed incompetent, thereafter 
being sent to a mental health facility.  
Once Appellant regained competence, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
agreement on the grounds that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, and that his 
previous counsel never alerted Appellant to the fact that his charges could potentially have been 
dismissed because of the violation. Evidence was presented at the evidentiary hearing that showed 
the State did not attempt to locate Appellant before his release. Appellant testified that at the time 
he entered the guilty plea, he was unaware that his right to a speedy trial may have been violated. 
Appellant’s former counsel did not testify.  
 The district court denied Appellant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Appellant then 
filed a motion to dismiss the case because of the violation of his right to a speedy trial. The district 
court denied this motion as well. The court convicted Appellant and sentenced him to 66 to 180 
months based on the guilty plea. 
Discussion 
 The Court stated that a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing may 
be granted for any reason where permitting withdrawal would be fair and just. Appellant based his 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the argument that his right to a speedy trial was violated.  
 
1  By Kim Strauss.  
2  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 The Court used the four-part Barker-Doggett test to evaluate the Appellant’s claim.3 The 
factors for the test are as follows: (1) whether delay before trial was uncommonly long; (2) whether 
the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay; (3) whether, in due 
course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether he suffered prejudice as 
the delay's result. No factor is singularly determinative, and all factors must be considered together. 
 First, the Court held that the delay of executing the warrant 25 months after its issuance 
was uncommonly long. Therefore, the first factor weighed in Appellant’s favor.  
Second, the Court held that the government was responsible for the delay because 
Appellant was in the government’s custody. A simple search would have alerted the government 
to the Appellant’s whereabouts. Therefore, the delay was a result of the government’s gross 
negligence, and the second factor weighed in favor of the Appellant.  
Third, the Court acknowledged that Appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial in 
due course; however, the Court held that Appellant had a colorable claim for the ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Because of this, the Appellant may not have been aware that his right to a 
speedy trial had been violated. Therefore, this factor did not weigh heavily against the Appellant.  
Lastly, because the Appellant had demonstrated that he suffered significant mental health 
issues as a result of learning he would not be released from prison, the Court held that the delay 
had prejudiced him by causing him anxiety and concern. In addition, Appellant testified that he 
would have more difficulty recollecting the circumstances of the crime for which the warrant was 
issued than he would have had if the warrant had been served in a timely fashion. Therefore, the 
Court held that the last factor weighed in favor of the Appellant.  
Weighing all of the factors together, the Court held that the Appellant made a strong 
argument that his right to a speedy trial had been violated.  
The Court then analyzed Appellant’s claim of ineffective counsel. The Court stated that 
the average, uneducated criminal defendant cannot reasonably be expected to understand that a 
delay in executing an arrest warrant may constitute a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The 
Court held that because Appellant had demonstrated he had a probable chance of having the 
charges against him dismissed under a violation of his right to a speedy trial, he likely would not 
have agreed to enter a guilty plea had his counsel alerted him to this fact. The Court ruled in favor 
of Appellant on this point because Appellant’s prior counsel did not testify, and the state failed to 
rebut Appellant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective. 
The Court held that the Appellant’s colorable claim of ineffective counsel coupled with his 
argument that his right to a speedy trial had been violated, constituted a fair and just reason for 
withdrawing his guilty plea.  
Conclusion 
 The Barker-Doggett factors weighed in favor of the Appellant’s argument that his right to 
a speedy trial had been violated. Appellant also made a strong argument that he would not have 
 
3  See Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647 (1992); see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
agreed to enter a guilty plea had it not been for his prior counsel’s failure to alert Appellant of the 
violation of his right to a speedy trial. Therefore, the Court vacated the judgment of conviction, 
reversed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and remanded 
the matter for the district court to consider Appellant’s motion to dismiss the charges. 
  
